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THE CHILD ABUSE AMENDMENTS OF 1984:
THE INFANT DOE AMENDMENT
During the 1960's, a growing public awareness led to state laws regarding
child abuse.' Today all fifty states have statutes, most of which are reporting
laws which encourage or mandate the reporting of suspected child abuse.2
In 1974, the federal government felt a need for further action and passed
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act.' This Act has been amended
several times, most recently in 1984.+
This comment focuses upon a new area of child abuse prevention, that of
the withholding of medical treatment from disabled newborns. Section one
discusses the increased public awareness of the extent of this practice. Section
two presents the initial government response to widespread publicity of the
practice. Section three examines the Congressional response to this problem
via the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984.1 Due to the widespread publicity of
one particular case, In re Infant Doe, the portion of the Amendment concern-
ing the withholding of medical treatment from disabled newborns is commonly
referred to as the Infant Doe Amendment.6 The intent of Congress was to
'See generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE. CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (Feb. 1980). See also C. KEMPE. THE
BATrERED CHILD SYNDROME (1962).
'See generally U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND WELFARE. CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLE.I- STAI'E
REPORTING LAWS (1980): V. DEFRANCIS AND C. LUCHr. CHILD ABUSE LEGISLArION IN THE 1970's (Rev. ed.
1974): Note. The Challenge of Child Abuse Cases: A Practical Approach. 9 J. LE6IS. 127 (19821: Note, Une-
qual and Inadequate Protection Under the Law: State Child Abuse Statutes. 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Unequal and Inadequate Protection] See also Fraser, A Glance at the
Past, A Gaze at the Present. A Glimpse at the Future: A Critical A nalysis of the Development of Child
Abuse Reporting Statutes. 54 CHil KENT L. REV. 641 (1978).
'Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (amended 1978, 1984)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 5101). This Act established the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect
to conduct studies and award demonstration and research grants to states in an effort to develop new
methods of identifying, treating, and preventing child abuse and neglect. State involvement is voluntary;
however, as a condition of receiving federal assistance under the Act, states must comply with the re-
quirements of the Act.
4Child Abuse Prevention And Treatment And Adoption Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-266, 92 Stat.
205 (1978), amended by Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5113, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-10412). (The 1978 amendment was an extension of
the original Act with increased funding.)
'The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107). (The 1984 amendment addressed four major issues: (1) In Title I there is an extension
of existing child abuse and treatment legislation (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107); (2) In Title I there is
the addition of a new section regarding the withholding of medical treatment from disabled newborns
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107); (3) In Title I1 there is an extension and additions to adoption legislation
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5111-5113); (4) In Title III there is the addition of a new section concerning family
violence prevention and treatment (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-10412)). See generally 130 CONG. REC.
S12382, 12387-90 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1984) (for a discussion by Senator Cranston on changes to Title I and
Title I); Id. at S12384-85 (for a discussion by Senator Kennedy on the new Title 1i).
'See In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct., Ind., Apr. 12, 1982). This case probably
more than any other started legislative action on the issue of withholding medical treatment, and for that
reason throughout the Congressional debates, this portion of the amendments was referred to as the "Infant
Doe" amendment. See generally, 130 CONG. REC. H376 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984); 130 CONG. REC. S9307
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establish a national policy regarding the ethical standards to be considered, the
person(s) to be the primary decisionmaker, and the laws to be applied. In con-
clusion, the comment examines whether the Infant Doe Amendment ac-
complishes the intent of Congress.
I. PUBLIC AWARENESS
The Infant Doe Amendment is not the result of a new phenomenon; per-
mitting unwanted and/or seriously ill or disabled newborn infants to die has oc-
curred throughout history.' Instead, it is the result of a new public awareness
and concern over the very complex moral issues surrounding nontreatment of
disabled newborns.' This new awareness is the result of publicity regarding the
scope and the acceptance within the medical community of the practice of
withholding medical treatment and of extensive media coverage of recent
court cases concerning nonconsent by parents.
In October of 1973, Doctors Raymond S. Duff and A.G.S. Campbell
studied the hospital records at Yale-New Haven Hospital to determine the ex-
tent to which death in infants had resulted from withdrawing or withholding
treatment. Their findings indicated that of 299 consecutive infant deaths oc-
curring in the special care nursery during the thirty months ending June 30,
1972, forty-three cases (fourteen percent) were related to witholding
treatment. 9 Specific incidents across the country have received widespread
public attention. 0
A survey conducted in 1977 examined the attitudes and practices of
pediatric surgeons and pediatricians with respect to some of the difficult ethical
issues that arise in neonatal practice." This survey revealed the acceptance
(daily ed. July 26, 1984); 130 CONG. REC. H 10327 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1984); 130 CONG. REC. SI2382 (daily
ed. Sept. 28, 1984).
'Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Robertson]; See generally, Silverman, Parents, Physicians, and the Death of Newborns:
Mismatched Attitudes about Neonatal Death, I I HASTINGS CENTER REP. 12 (1981). See also J. GOULD& L.
CRAIGMYLE, YOUR DEATH WARRANT?. 22 (197 1) (Greeks exposed unwanted disabled infants to the elements
until they died, other cultures eliminated female infants because they were burdensome on their warring and
hunting efforts); Nolan-Haley, Defective Children, Their Parents, and the Death Decision, J. LEGAL MED. 9
(Jan., 1976) [hereinafter cited as Nolan-Haley] (Roman fathers had the power of life or death over their
children; prior to the Conquest, an English father could kill a child who had not yet tasted food).
'See generally, supra note 6.
9Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Duff & Campbelll. (They reported that in most cases the decision not to treat was
made jointly by the parents and physicians when they concluded that the prognosis for a meaningful life was
poor).
"See Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides? 7 AM. J. L. & MED. 393, 399-400 (1982) (for a
discussion of two widely publicized incidents at John Hopkins Hospital in the 1970's involving decisions by
parents to withhold corrective surgery from newborns with Down's syndrome and intestinal obstructions);
See also Time, Mar. 25, 1974, at 84.
"Shaw, Ethical Issues in Pediatric Surgery: A National Survey of Pediatricians and Pediatric Surgeons, 60
PEDIATRICS 588 (Oct., 1977) [hereinafter cited as Shaw, Ethical Issuesl (Survey consisted of a questionnaire
mailed to 400 members of the surgical section of the American Academy of Pediatrics of which 267 were
returned and 308 which were mailed to all chairpersons of teaching departments of pediatrics in the U.S. of
[Vol. 18:3
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within the profession of withholding treatment. Among the pertinent results of
the survey were:
(1) 76.8% of the pediatric surgeons and 49.5% of the pediatricians would
acquiese in the parents' decision to refuse consent for surgery in a
newborn with intestinal atresia 2 and Down's syndrome.1
3
,14
(2) 23.6% of the pediatric surgeons and 13.2% of the pediatricians would
encourage parents to withhold consent and 51.7% of the former and
38.4% of the latter would respect whatever decision parents made
concerning treatment of an infant with duodenal atresia l and Down's
syndrome.1 6
(3) Of those that accepted withholding lifesaving surgery in the last ex-
ample, 63.3% of the surgeons and 42.6% of the pediatricians would
also stop supportive treatment including intravenous fluids and nasal
gastric suction. 7
(4) 60.7% of the pediatric surgeons and 80% of the pediatricians felt that
children with Down's syndrome "are capable of being useful and
bringing love and happiness into the home." 62% of the group would
nevertheless acquiese in the parents decision to withhold lifesaving
surgery for atresia. 18 Only 7% would seek a court order for surgery. 9
In addition, recent court cases dealing with the issue of parental nonconsent
for corrective treatment have aroused extensive public attention. Probably the
best known is In re Infant Doe.20 On April 19, 1982, a baby known only as "In-
which 190 were returned). Contra, Strain, The Decision to Forego L0/e Sustaining Treatment for Seriously
111 Newborns, 72 PEDIATRICS 572 (Oct. 1983).
"Intestinal atresia is a congenital obstruction of the intestine at any level due to lack of continuity of the
lumen. See DORLANDS MEDICAL DICTIONARY. 135 (26th ed. 1981).
"Down's syndrome is a condition characterized by a small anteoposterioly flattened skull and short flat-
bridged nose, associated with a chromosomal abnormality. Results in moderate to severe mental retardation.
Also called mongolism. Id. at 1290.
"See Shaw, Ethical Issues, supra note I I at 590.
"Duodenal atresia is a congenital absence or occlusion of a portion of the duodenum (first or proximal por-
tion of small intestine) and is associated with Down's syndrome. See DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY at
135.
"See Shaw, Ethical Issues, supra note I1, at 591-92. It should be noted that only 3.4% of the pediatric
surgeons and 15.8% of the pediatricians would seek a court order to overrule parental decisions.
"See Shaw, Ethical Issues, supra note I I at 592-93.
"Atresia is a congenital absence or closure of a normal body orifice. See DORLANDS MEDICAL DICTIONARY
at 135.
"See Shaw, Ethical Issues, supra note II, at 595.
"in re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct., Ind., April 12, 1982), This case was
reported on MacNeil-Lehrer Report, Saving Newborns (May 18, 1982). It also received wide coverage in
legal and medical journals. See, e.g., Kuzma, The Legislative Response to Infant Doe, 59 IND. L.J. 377
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Kuzma]; Comment, Defective Newborns: Inconsistent Application of Legal Prin-
ciple Emphasized by the Infant Doe Case, 14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 569 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Defective Newborns); Shapiro, Statute - Medical Treatment of Defective Newborns: An Answer to the
"Baby Doe"Dilemma, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 137 (1983); Weir, The Government and Selective Non Treat-
ment of Handicapped Infants, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 661 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Weirl.
COMMENTSWinter, 19851
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fant Doe" was born with Down's syndrome and esophageal atresia with
associated tracheosophageal fistula.' The latter condition, which was correct-
able,2 is fatal if not surgically repaired. After consulting with the treating
physician, the parents refused to consent to corrective surgery or intravenous
feeding and Infant Doe died of starvation six days later.
Prior to Infant Doe's death, the hospital sought legal advice and the issue
of withholding corrective treatment went to court.13 Neither the Monroe
County Circuit Court nor the Indiana Supreme Court would overrule the
parents' decision to withhold treatment. Infant Doe died while his guardian ad
litem was on the way to appeal the case to the United States Supreme Court. 4
I1. INITIAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
Infant Doe's nontreatment was not the only such incident to reach the
courts and/or media. 5 However, the national coverage it received resulted in
the federal government's first reaction to this issue. The initial response came
from the White House in the form of a memorandum issued by President
Reagan on April 30, 1982, just fifteen days after Infant Doe's death.'6 The
memo instructed the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) to notify health care providers that section 504 of the Federal
"Esophageal atrisia with tracheoesophageal fistula is a congenital defect in which the esophagus is con-
nected with the trachea. Repeated aspiration and gastroesophagotracheal reflex cause rapidly progressive
respiratory distress and the infant will die if left untreated. See A. RUDOLPH. PEDIATRICS 1015-17 (16th ed.
1977).
11d.. corrective surgery is routinely performed with success. See also Pless, Correspondence. The Story of
Baby Doe, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 664 (Sept. 1983). Dr. Pless performed the autopsy on Infant Doe and
reported "an infant with obvious Down's syndrome and reparable esophageal atresia and tracheoesophageal
fistula ...." (emphasis added).
"In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct., Ind., April 12, 1983) cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
394 (1983), See Kuzma, supra note 20, at n.7, reports of the Indiana Supreme Court decision in Bloomington
Sunday Herald Times, Apr. 10, 1983, at 1, col. I. Little is known about this case or the subsequent appeal to
the Indiana Supreme Court because the medical records and court proceedings were sealed by the court. In-
formation regarding the case is limited to newspaper reports, correspondence with the attorneys involved,
and the Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court. See also Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1982, at A16, col. I;
Bloomington Herald-Telephone, Apr. 16, 1982, at 1, col. I; Id.. Apr. 20, 1982, at I, col. 5; Indianapolis Star,
Apr. 16, 1982, at I, col. 4.
'it should be noted that while Infant Doe was allowed to starve to death during the court proceedings, there
were people willing to adopt him to save his life. However, apparently this did not matter to the court. See
130 CONG. REC. H376, 394 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (Rep. Hyde).
"Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (rev'd the lower
court's ruling requiring surgery( affd, 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186 (1983) (aff'd for different reasons).
This case also received scrutiny by the commentators, e.g., Kerr, Reporting the Case of Baby Jane Doe, 14
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7 (Aug. 1984); see also Brown & Truitt, Euthanasia and the Right to Die, 3 OHIo
N.U. L. REV. 615, 632-34 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Brown & Truitt] (Reports on two cases: Maine Medical
Center v. Houle, No. 74-145 (Super. Ct. Cumberland Cty., Me., Feb. 14, 1974) (male infant with multiple
disabilities, parents refused to consent to corrective surgery overruled by the court); Brown & Truitt also
discuss an unreported case from Detroit in which the court ordered treatment for a child with disabilities
similar to Infant Doe's, Down's syndrome and duodenal atresia.); Note, Birth-Defective Infants: A Standard
for Non Treatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REV. 599, 601 n. 13 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Birth-
Defective Infants]; Stinson & Stinson, On the Death of a Baby, 244 ATL. MONTHLY 64 (1979) (Parents tell
their story on the death of their son.)
16Memorandum from President Reagan to Secretary Schweiker (April 30, 1982). 47 Fed. Reg. 26027 (1982).
[Vol. 18:3
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Rehabilitation Act of 197321 "forbids recipients of federal funds from
withholding from handicapped citizens, any benefits or services that would or-
dinarily be provided to persons without handicaps."28 On May 18, 1982, the
President's instructions were carried out when HHS issued a "Notice to Health
Care Providers. 29
HHS followed this notice with the issuance of regulations on March 7,
1983, which required hospitals receiving federal funds to establish a twenty-
four hour "Handicapped Infant Hotline" and to post signs in the delivery
rooms, pediatric wards, nurseries, and neonatal intensive-care units which
read: "Discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infants in this
facility is prohibited by federal law."3 HHS based its authority to issue the
regulations on section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.31 Reaction to the
regulations by the medical profession was quick and negative. The American
Academy of Pediatrics brought suit in the district court of the District of Co-
lumbia and was successful in preventing implementation of the regulations.32
HHS revised this regulation and on July 5, 1983, issued a new proposed
rule which only slightly changed the March 7 version, but did provide for a six-
ty day comment period.3 The proposed regulation resulted in nearly 17,000
comments and based on its analysis of these comments, HHS modified the July
5 proposal and issued a final regulation on January 12, 1984.31 This new
27Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
2 Memorandum from President Reagan to Secretary Schweiker (April 30, 1982). 47 Fed. Reg. 26027 (1982).
"47 Fed. Reg. 26027 (1982) (Notice from Betty Lou Dotson, Director, Office of Civil Rights for HHS to
"Health Care Providers" May 18, 1982). The notice in pertinent part stated:
Under section 504 it is unlawful for a recipient of Federal financial assistance to withhold from han-
dicapped infant nutritional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment required to correct a life-
threatening condition, if:
(1) The withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handicapped: and
(2) The handicap does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance medically contrain-
dicated.
148 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 84) (interim final rule to become effective March 22.
1983) (later declared invalid in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C.
1983)). (HHS said the purpose of the hot-line and the signs were to facilitate the reporting of parents, physi-
cians and hospitals not in compliance with the new regulation).
"Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
2American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983). Judge Gesell held the regula-
tions were invalid as an arbitrary and capricious agency action because there was no evidence showing the
agency considered the possible disruptive effects of the hotline and no attempt was made to address the issue
whether termination of treatment might be appropriate in certain cases. Also the regulations were invalid
due to the failure to follow procedural requirements in its promulgation as set out in the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553b & 553d, 706 (2) (A). HHS usually satisfies this Act by publishing new regula-
tions in the Federal Register, and soliciting comments from interested parties. In dictum, Judge Gesell ques-
tioned § 504 as valid authority and raised the constitutional issue of parental autonomy in that the regula-
tions to some extent eliminated the role of the infant's parents in choosing medical treatment.
1148 Fed. Reg. 30846 (1983) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 84) (proposed July 5, 1983) (reissued as 49 Fed. Reg.
1622 (1984)). (Instructions for posting the notice were more specific and formalized existing responsibilities
of child protective service agencies receiving federal assistance to carry out requirements of the regulation).
1449 Fed. Reg. 1622 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 85) (final rule Jan. 12. 1984) (later declared invalid in
American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler 585 F. Supp. 541 (1984)). (The Jan. 12 rule attempted to deal with some of
Winter, 19851 COMMENTS
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regulation was again met with criticism and a successful court challenge by the
American Hospital Association and the American Medical Association.35 HHS
has appealed this decision but as it currently stands, there are no HHS regula-
tions governing nontreatment of disabled newborns. 6
III. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
Handicapped newborns remained in need of legislative protection
because, like any other segment of our society, they are entitled to protection
from the "deprivation of life."37 Each year approximately 30,000 severely
disabled infants are born in the United States, and with the continuing ad-
vances in neonatology, genetics, and pediatric surgery, this number can only
increase .3 At the same time, because of the complexity of the issue and a lack
of legislative guidance, the courts, parents, and physicians were making incon-
sistent decisions regarding the ethical standards to be considered," the
the objections found by Judge Gesell. The notice requirement was changed, HHS tried to better identify the
infants covered by the rule and justified its authority under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The
new rule included a model for Infant Care Review Committees and also set up HHS investigation
guidelines).
"American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (1984). The court, on the AMA's motion for summaryjudgment, held that the regulations were not authorized by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The
court relied upon United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984) which held that although a
newborn infant with multiple birth defects was a "handicapped individual" within the meaning of § 504, the
Act's provision prohibiting discrimination against "otherwise qualified" handicapped individuals did not
reach medical treatment decisions involving defective newborns. Thus HHS lacked statutory authority for
the regulations. Contra 49 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1635-36 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 84) (final rule Jan. 12,
19841 (later declared invalid in American Hosp. Ass'n v. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (1984)).
"For discussions pertaining to the HHS regulations see generally, Kuzma, supra note 20; Weir, supra note
20; Strain, The American Academy of Pediatrics Comments on the "Baby Doe 1/" Regulations, 309 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 443 (Aug. 1983); Annas, Disconnecting the Baby Doe Hotline 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14(June, 1983); Berseth, A Neonatologist Looks at the Baby Doe Rule: Ethical Decision by Edict, 72
PEDIATRICS 428 (Sept., 1983); Murray, At Last, Final Rules on Baby Doe, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17(1984); Johnson & Thompson, The 'Baby Doe'Rule: Is It All Bad? 73 PEDIATRICS 729 (May, 1984).
"U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. See, Commonwealth v. O'Neil, 367 Mass. 440, 449, 327 N.E.2d 662, 668
(1975) "ITIhe right to life is the basis of all other rights and in the absence of life other rights do not exist...
A denial of this fundamental concept would be tantamount to a denial of human existence."
"See COMMrITEE REPORT MEDICAL ETHICS: THE RIGHT To SURVIVAL. 1974: HEARINGS ON THE EXAMINA.
TION OF THE MORAL AND ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACED WITH THE AGONIZING DECISION OF LIFE AND
DEATH BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE.
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974).
"What factors should the decision maker be allowed to consider when deciding whether to withhold treat-
ment? Three different views have developed, each with its supporters. One view, the "sanctity of life" ethic,
requires maximum treatment in all cases, regardless of the possible outcome. Another view, the "quality of
life" ethic, allows consideration of the predicted quality of life of the infant and the resulting burdens on
family and society. Lastly, the "medically beneficial" ethic limits the focus to the child's medical condition
and the feasibility of treatment. It allows for those cases where treatment would be futile or inhumane. See
text infra, pp. 8-1I and accompanying notes for a discussion of these views.
[Vol. 18:3
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person(s) to be the primary decisionmaker" and the laws to be applied."' Thus,
the infant's life depended upon the jurisdiction or hospital in which he is born.
A. The New Requirements
Congress recognized the need for a national policy regarding the nontreat-
ment issue. 2 To satisfy this need, Congress, via the Child Abuse Amendments
of 1984, added a new clause (K) to section 4(b) (2) of the Child Abuse Preven-
tion and Treatment Act. 3 Section 4(b) (2) authorizes grants to carry out child
abuse prevention and treatment programs and lists the requirements a state
must meet to qualify for these grants." Specifically, section 4(b) (2) (K) requires
states which receive federal child abuse prevention grants under the Act, to in-
corporate procedures and/or programs, within the state child protective service
system, to respond to reported cases of medical neglect.5 The term medical
neglect, as used in the Act, includes but is not limited to, the withholding of
medically indicated treatment from a disabled infant with a life-threatening
condition." These procedures and/or programs must be operational by October
9, 1985 and provide for:
"The decision could be made by the parents, the treating physician(s), an infant care review committee, or
the court. See Shaw, Ethical Issues, supra note Ii, at 594 (half of the surveyed group felt parents should
decide, one-third felt either the physician or an infant care review committee should decide). Courts faced
with the issue have resulted in conflicting holdings, See e.g., In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe
County Cir. Ct., Ind., Apr. 12, 1982) (held that parents should decide); contra Maine Medical Center v.
Houle, No. 74-145 (Super. Ct. Cumberland County, Me., Feb. 14, 1974) (parents refused consent for correc-
tive surgery, the court intervened and ordered surgery).
4"Under existing law, does the right of choice even exist for the parents and physicians? See Robertson, supra
note 7 (He argues that parents who withhold ordinary care from a disabled newborn, as well as physicians,
nurses and hospital officials who acquiese to parents' decisions, risk criminal liability ranging from homicide
to neglect and violation of child abuse reporting laws); contra, see Note, Birth-Defective Infants. supra note
25 (argues the choice to withhold treatment in certain situations is legal); see generally Comment, Defective
Newborns, supra note 20 (for a discussion of inconsistent application of legal principles by the courts faced
with the issue).
'The theme in the Congressional debates was the need for a national policy because of the inconsistency
that had developed regarding the Infant Doe issue, see e.g.. 130 CONG. REt. H376, 379 Idaily ed. Feb. 2,
1984) (Rep. Murphy in explaining to the House the need for the Amendment "... in an attempt to maintain
uniformity, we have given legislative authority to the States to address Ithe issue of withholding treatmenti.
Courts have no legislative guidance and have thus been handing down different decisions in various sections
of the country.")
'Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749, 1752 (1984) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 5103(b) (2)). See H.R. REP. No. 1038, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40-44, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG & AD. NEws 2918, 2969-2973. (Joint Explanatory Statement by principal sponsors of compromise
amendment regarding services and treatment for disabled infants. tHereinafter cited as Joint Statement]
(The conferees stated that they "endorse and adopt as their own the Joint Explanatory Statement of the
sponsors of the amendment.") Id. at 2936.
"4See Joint Statement, supra note 43, at 2970. (States that pertinent existing requirements of 42 U.S.C. §
5103(b) (2) such as reporting mechanisms and provisions for the appointment of a guardian ad litem are ap-
plicable to the new clause(K). For a complete list of requirements states must meet in order to qualify for
assistance under the Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b) (2)).
"Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749, 1752 (1984) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 5103(b) (2)); See Joint Statement, supra note 43, at 2969.
*See. infra n. 69-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the meaning of medically indicated treatment
Winter, 19851 COMMENTS
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(1) Coordination and consultation between the child protective services
and designated individuals within the health care facilities;
(2) Prompt notification by designated health care personnel to child pro-
tective service systems of cases of suspected medical neglect; and
(3) Authority under state law for the state's child protective services
system to pursue any legal remedies, including initiating court pro-
ceedings, to prevent the withholding of medically indicated treatment
from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions.47
The Infant Doe Amendment was the result of a substantial consensus
among Congress, and most medical, professional and advocacy organizations
which have an interest in the nontreatment issue. 8 The Amendment generally
followed the guidelines set forth by the Principles of Treatment of Disabled In-
fants issued in 1983 by a broad coalition of medical associations and advocacy
organizations, including the American Academy of Pediatrics.49
B. Ethical Standards
A key element of the nontreatment issue is the ethical standard to be
followed in each instance. Congress had three alternative standards to consider
when writing the legislation: (1) quality of life, (2) sanctity of life, and (3)
"See, Child Abuse Amendments and Joint Statement supra note 45. The new (K) clause is the most impor-
tant addition of the amendments, however, other changes were made to supplement and help in the enforce-
ment of clause (K): I1) The Secretary of HHS must publish for public comment proposed regulations to im-
plement clause 1K) 149 Fed. Reg. 4816011984) I(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 13401 proposed Dec. 10, 1984
and publish final regulations after comments are evaluated. 121 The Secretary must publish interim model
guidelines to encourage the establishment within health care facilities of infant care review committees (49
Fed. Reg. 48170 11984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) 1proposed Dec. 10, 19841) and publish final model
guidelines after comments are evaluated. 131 The Amendment requires the Secretary to provide directly or
through grants or contracts with public or private nonprofit organizations, for training and technical
assistance programs to assist states in satisfying the requirements of clause (KI, also for establishing and
operating national and regional clearinghouses to provide the most current information regarding medical
treatment procedures and resources. 14) A new subsection 41cl is added to authorize the Secretary to make
additional grants to states for developing and establishing and operating or implementing la) the procedures
or programs required under clause (K): I information and evaluation or training programs for parents.
employees of child protective services programs and health care facilities: Ic) programs to help coordinate
necessary services to assist the families with disabled infants and facilitate adoption placement.
"The groups who worked with Congress in developing the Infant Doe Amendment are: The American
Academy of Pediatrics, American Hospital Association, Catholic Health Association, National Association
of Children's Hospitals and Related Institutions, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
American Nurses Association, American College of Physicians, California Association of Children's
Hospitals, Nurses Association of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American
Association on Mental Deficiency, Association for Retarded Citizens (U.S.), Spina-Bifida Association of
America, Downs-Syndrome Congress, People First of Nebraska, the Association for Persons with Severe
Handicaps (TASH), Disability Rights Center, Operational Real Rights, Christian Action Council, and the
National Right to Life Committee. A notable exception from the list is the American Medical Association.
The AMA opposed the new legislation because it is against any type of definitive rules and regulations or
definitive statutory language on this issue. The AMA wants only the doctors and parents involved in the
decision and any type of government intervention is unacceptable. See 130 CONG. REC. S 9307, 9320- I (daily
ed. July 26, 1984) (Senators Hatch & Dodd explaining AMA's position); 48 Fed. Reg. 1622, 1624 (1984) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. 84) final rules issued Jan. 12, 1984) (declared invalid in American Hosp. Ass'n v.
Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (1984)).
4'See infra note 67 (for the text of the Joint Policy Statement); American Academy of Pediatrics Joint Policy
Statement, Principles of Treatment of Disabled Infants, 73 PEDIATRICS 559 (1984).
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medically beneficial. Each standard will be examined.
A quality of life ethic places relative rather than absolute value on human
life.5 0 This is the standard most often proposed to justify terminating or
withholding treatment from disabled newborns." It is based on the theory that
certain newborns may not have a "life worth living," and therefore, the type of
life the infant will lead if treated should be predicted. The ethic assumes that if
the potential quality of life is viewed as extremely poor, then death is
preferable, and the infant is better off without treatment. 52
The essence of the quality of life argument is a proxy's judgment that no
reasonable person would prefer life unless he could lead a "normal" life. 3 The
proxy is usually a normal adult who has led a life accustomed to his social and
intellectual surroundings, who reasons it is better to die than to live a life
without these basic human capabilities. 4 However, as pointed out by Professor
Robertson, this philosophy may be seriously flawed:
A standard based on healthy, ordinary development may be entirely inap-
propriate to this situation. One who has never known the pleasures of
mental operation, ambulation, and social interaction surely does not suf-
fer from their loss as much as one who has. While one who has known
these capacities may prefer death to a life without them, we have no
assurance that the handicapped person, with no point of comparison,
would agree. Life, and life alone, whatever its limitations, might be of suf-
ficient worth to him. 55
In addition, one of the more controversial aspects of this ethic is that it in-
cludes not only considerations of the infant's future prognosis, but also the im-
pact of the infant's survival on his family and society as a whole.56 Proponents
argue that the minimal benefit of treatment to infants incapable of full social
and physical development does not justify the burdens that the care of these in-
fants imposes on parents, family, health professionals and society in general.
This argument assumes that because the infant will not lead a "normal" life,
the costs or suffering of others is greater than the benefit of life to the child
and, as a result, the child is asked to sacrifice his life to benefit others.57
-°See Nolan-Haley, supra note 7, at 9.
"See Note, Birth-Defective Infants, supra note 25, at 620.
521d.
"Robertson, supra note 7, at 254.
'
4Arras, On the Care of Imperiled Newborns: Toward an Ethic ofAmbiguity, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25,
30 (April 1984).
"Robertson, supra note 7, at 254.
'Id. at 255; See also Kuzma, supra note 20, at 384.
"Robertson, supra note 7, at 255-56. Professor Robertson argues that this type of judgment requires a
coherent way of measuring and comparing interpersonal utilities which has never been accomplished. "In
the absence of principaled grounds for such a decision, the social equation involved in mandating direct, in-
voluntary euthanasia becomes a difference of degree, not kind, and we reach the point where protection of
life depends solely on social judgments of utility."
Winter, 19851 COMMENTS
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Another criticism of this ethic is that the predictive criterion is too
unreliable." Because the standard is so flexible, in proxy assessments of the
quality of life, there is a great margin for error. Forecasting is not infallible,
and since the decision is irreversible, the medical prognosis must be made with
a high degree of certainty. 59,60
The sanctity of life ethic is at the opposite end of the spectrum. Absolute
value is placed on life, and treatment is required in all cases if at all feasible to
sustain life regardless of the outcome.6 Supporters believe that all living
creatures contain a spark of the divine and are therefore sacred.62 The major
criticism of this ethic is that requiring treatment in all cases can lead to in-
humane consequences.63
Congress has opted for a standard between these two extremes by specify-
ing the circumstances under which it is permissible to withhold medically in-
dicated treatment. By definition, treatment is generally considered medically
indicated whenever the infant's life-threatening condition can be bettered or
corrected.' This is a strict standard which places a high regard on the infant's
interest in life, but it is also flexible enough to recognize those cases where
treatment can be justifiably withheld. This standard received broad backing
within the medical community5 and closely resembles the standards previously
proposed by The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Bio-Medical and Behavioral Research" and The Principles of
111d. at 255.
"See, e.g. Note, Birth-Defective Infants, supra note 25, at 623-24 n. 123 (five children were born with spina
bifida, the physicians recommended against treatment. Four have completed several years in normal public
school and the fifth is normal except for paralysis from the knees down).
"Criticism of the quality of life ethic may be best summarized by a passage written by George Will: "The
treatment should not be withheld to cause the death of a newborn because parents decide, on the basis of the
doctors' guesses, that the child's life would be inconvenient, disappointing, or without acceptable quality."
130 CONG. REC. H376, 382 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (Rep. Bartlett quoting George Will). Contra see Duff &
Campbell, supra note 9; Lorber, Selective Treatment of Myelomeningocele: To Treat or Not to Treat?. 53
PEDIATRICS 307 (March, 1974). See also Shaw, Ethical Issues, supra note II, at 593 (90% of the surveyed
group would base a decision to treat on the potential quality of life).
"See Nolan-Haley, supra note 7, at 9.
"'Robertson, supra note 7 at 248. Supporters also point out that identifying which infants are unworthy of
care is a difficult task and will eventually take a toll on the decisionmakers. See also Singer, Sanctity of Life
or Quality of Life?, 72 PEDIATRICS 128 (July, 1983).
"See Robertson, supra note 7, at 252; See also Brown & Truitt, supra note 25, at 624. (This article points out
that even Pope Pius XII in 1976 recognized that when death becomes inevitable a physician can discontinue
treatment "in order to permit the patient already virtually dead to pass on in peace.")
"See infra notes 69-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the definition of medically indicated treat-
ment.
"See supra note 48, for a list of organizations supporting the Infant Doe Amendment.
"PRESIDENTS COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL & BIOMEDICAL &
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT. Washington D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, March, 1983. In pertinent part the Commission stated:
This [standard for providing medically beneficial treatment] is a very strict standard in that it excludes
consideration of the negative effects of an impaired child's life on other persons, including parents,
siblings, and society. Although abiding by this standard may be difficult in specific cases, it is all too
[Vol. 18:3
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Treatment of Disabled Infants.67 The Amendment and these proposals require
that the primary focus be upon the infant's present medical condition and the
feasibility of treatment, both of which are arguably less speculative than a
prognosis about an infant's projected quality of life.
To avoid the same potential for abuse that exists in the quality of life stan-
dard, the definition of medically indicated treatment must protect the infant's
interests by determinable criteria which provide certainty and consistency in
practice. To accomplish this, the exceptions within the definition which permit
the withholding of treatment must be narrowly and carefully defined. This will
eliminate much of the uncertainty and leave little ambiguity in application.
68
Interpretive guidance of "medically indicated treatment" is found in three
sources. 69 The Amendment itself defines the "withholdipg of medically in-
dicated treatment" as:
the failure to respond to the infant's7" life-threatening condition7 by pro-
easy to undervalue the lives of handicapped infants; the Commission finds it imperative to counteract
this by treating them no less vigorously than their healthy peers or other older children with similar
handicaps would be treated.
"American Academy of Pediatrics Joint Policy Statement, Principles of Treatment of Disabled Infants, 73
PEDIATRICS 559 (1984). The statement provided:
When medical care is clearly beneficial, it should always be provided. When appropriate medical care
is not available, arrangements should be made to transfer the infant to an appropriate medical facility.
Consideration such as anticipated or actual limited potential of an individual and present or future
lack of available community resources are irrelevant and must not determine the decisions concerning
medical care. The individual's medical condition should be the sole focus of the decision. These are
very strict standards.
It is ethically and legally justified to withhold medical or surgical procedures which are clearly
futile and will only prolong the act of dying. However, supportive care should be provided, including
sustenance as medically indicated and relief of pain and suffering. The needs of the dying person
should be respected. The family also should be supported in its grieving.
In cases where it is uncertain whether medical treatment will be beneficial, a person's disability
must not be the basis for a decision to withhold treatment. At all times during the process when deci-
sions are being made about the benefit or futility of medical treatment, the person should be cared for
in the medically most appropriate ways. When doubt exists at any time about whether to treat, a
presumption always should be in favor of treatment.
"See generally Note, Birth-Defective Infants, supra note 25, at 625-26.
'First, see Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749, 1752 (1984) (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 5102(3)) for the definition of "withholding medically indicated treatment." Second, see Joint
Statement, supra note 43, at 2970, for the definition of "infant" and "reasonable medical judgment." Third,
see 49 Fed. Reg. 48160 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984). HHS as required
by the Amendment, has issued a proposed regulation which includes definitions of terms and phrases used
within the definition of "withholding medically indicated treatment." HHS states that this was done to help
clarify and eliminate possible ambiguities. Final regulations will be issued only after comments have been
received and evaluated. Thus the HHS definitions are subject to change. See supra, note 47.
"See Joint Statement, supra note 43, at 2970. "Infant" is defined as less than one year although older infants
who have been hospitalized continuously since birth may be included. However, the reference to one year is
not to imply treatment is to be changed once the infant reaches one; 49 Fed. Reg. 48160, 48166 (1984) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984).
7'149 Fed. Reg. 48160, 48166 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984). Life-
threatening condition "means a condition that threatens the life of the infant or that significantly increases
the risk of the onset of complications that may threaten the life of the infant." HHS gives the example of
myelomeningocele which if left untreated increases the risk of infection which may become life-threatening
or add to the disability. See 49 Fed. Reg. at 48163.
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viding treatment72 (including appropriate nutrition, hydration, and medi-
cation) which, in the treating [physician'sl reasonable medical judgment,"
will be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such
conditions[.] [However] the term does not include the failure to provide
treatment (other than appropriate nutrition, hydration, or medication) to
an infant when, in the treating [physician's] reasonable medical judgment:
(A) The infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(B) The provision of such treatment would
(i) merely prolong dying,74
(ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's
life-threatening conditions,75 or
(iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or
(C) The provision of such treatment would be virtually futile76 in terms of
the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such cir-
cumstances would be inhumane.77
A few general observations can be made about the definitions found in all
three sources. In all cases, a disabled infant must receive appropriate nutrition,
hydration, and medication.78 Thus, even in cases where treatment is not
7249 Fed. Reg. at 48167, "treatment" includes (but is not limited to):
(A) Further evaluation by a physician(s) whose expertise is appropriate to the condition(s) involved or
further evaluation at a facility with specialized capabilities regarding the condition(s) involved;
and
(B) Multiple medical treatments and/or surgical procedures over a period of time that are designed to
ameliorate or correct a life-threatening condition or conditions.
73See Joint Statement, supra note 43, at 2970. "Reasonable medical judgment" means a medical judgment
that would be made by a reasonable prudent physician, knowledgeable about the case and the treatment
possibilities with respect to the medical conditions involved"; See also, 49 Fed. Reg. 48160, 48167 (1984) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984).
7'49 Fed. Reg. 48160, 48167 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec. 19, 1984). "Merely pro-
long dying" "refers to situations where death is imminent and treatment will do no more than postpone the
act of dying."
751d.
The term 'not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions'
shall not be interpreted to permit the withholding of medically indicated treatment in the following
two circumstances:
(A) Treatment for a disabled infant on the grounds that one or more of the infant's nontreatable con-
ditions, although not imminently life- threatening, will become life-threatening in the future.
[HHS gave the example of Down's syndrome which is associated with shortening of life span. Id
at 48164.1
(B) Ameliorative treatment to make a condition more tolerable, such as providing palliative treat-
ment to relieve severe pain, even if the overall prognosis, taking all conditions into account, is
that the infant will survive.
In addition, under the definition, when the infant suffers from more than one life-threatening condition but
only one is correctable and no treatment is available to avoid imminent death, then no treatment is
necessary for the correctable condition, except with respect to appropriate nutrition, hydration and medica-
tion; See Joint Statement, supra note 43, at 2970.
649 Fed. Reg. 48160, 48167 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984). Virtually
futile "means that the treatment is highly unlikely to prevent imminent death."
"Id. "The term the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane means that the treatment
itself involves significant medical contraindication and/or significant pain and suffering for the infant that
clearly outweigh the very slight potential benefit of the treatment for an infant highly unlikely to survive."
78Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749, 1752 (1984) (to be codified at 42
[Vol. 18:3
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medically indicated, medication must be provided to relieve pain and suffering
and it is no longer permissible to allow death by starvation or dehydration. All
disabled infants must be given medically indicated treatment or the physician
may be liable for medical neglect.79
Three circumstances were established in which treatment is not con-
sidered medically indicated. The first situation is in the case of certain coma-
tose infants. The second instance pertains to infants who are born dying and
treatment would not ameliorate or correct all of the life-threatening condi-
tions, but would just prolong the act of dying. However, treatment which
would ameliorate the infant's overall condition is required, such as to relieve
severe pain. Congress clearly expects physicians to apply humane treatment
whenever necessary to ameliorate the infant's overall condition." The third
situation allows for those gray areas where there seems to be no clear answer.
The physician must make a judgment call in considering whether the treat-
ment itself is inhumane because of the associated pain and suffering as com-
pared to a very slim chance of survival.8
One final observation is that these decisions are to be made based upon
the physician's "reasonable medical judgment." 2 Only judgments that would
be made by a reasonably prudent physician, knowledgeable about the case and
treatment possibilities with respect to the medical conditions involved will be
deemed reasonable. 3 This is not a new standard in the medical community, but
it is new in application to the withholding of medically indicated treatment."
U.S.C. § 5102(3)); 49 Fed. Reg. 48160, 48163 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec. 10,
1984). See 130 CONG. REC. 59307, 9322 (daily ed. July 26, 1984). See also 48 Fed. Reg. 30846, 30852 (1983)
(proposed rules issued July 5, 1983). (HHS expresses the department's view of withholding food and water).
But cf. Lynn & Childress, Feeding the Dying Patient: Must Patients Always be Given Food and Water?, 13
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17 (Oct., 1983) (Explores situations where it would be in patient's best interest not to
receive food and water).
7949 Fed. Reg. 48160, 48163 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984).
'°49 Fed. Reg. at 48164. HHS gives an example of an infant with noncorrectable life-threatening congenital
heart defect and an imperforate anus. Even though no treatment would correct the heart, a colostomy could
be performed to ameliorate the infant's overall condition by relieving the severe pain associated with the im-
perforate anus. This seems to be a valid interpretation of Congressional intent as Congress specifically stated
the consideration of the humaneness of a particular treatment should be considered in selecting among alter-.
natives. See Joint Statement. supra note 43, at 2970.
'149 Fed. Reg. at 48163. See 130 CONG. REC. 59307, 9324 (daily ed. July 26, 1984) (Sen. Nickles discussing
definition of withholding medically indicated treatment).
849 Fed. Reg. 48160, 48163 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984).
"
3See supra note 73 for the definition of "reasonable medical judgment." See H.R. REP. No. 1038, 98th
Cong., 2d. Sess. 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2918, 2927. (citing Dr. McLone, speak-
ing of infants with spina bifida in testimony submitted to the Subcommittee on Family and Human Services:
The single most common reason for the denial of care was lack of recent information of available
treatment and the outcome of that treatment. When confronted with recent developments in medical
care and documented advances in patient outcome by physicians with substantial experience in the
care of these children, most of these parents and physicians were able to resolve their doubts and
decide in favor of treating the child. In most cases then, continuing education of the public and profes-
sionals provided the solution of the dilemma.
"See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 32, at 161 (1982) (Prosser states that physicians
who undertake work requiring special skill are required to possess a standard minimum of special knowledge
and ability).
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Though inevitably somewhat subjective and imprecise in actual application,
by confining or limiting judgment to specific criteria in which treatment can be
justifiably withheld and by focusing on the medical condition and treatment
possibilities and not abstract concepts such as "quality of life," much of the
uncertainty in application should be eliminated.
C. Primary Decisionmaker
By definition, the standard of medically indicated treatment relies upon
reasonable medical judgment in the decisionmaking process. 5 Once Congress
established that the decision must be based upon reasonable medical judgment,
it naturally followed that the primary decisionmaker should be a medical pro-
fessional. Congress realized that the federal government is not in the position
to establish medical standards and practices. 6 Because of the variety of
disabilities and the differing degrees of each, the decision should be left to those
most qualified. At the same time, to ensure reliable and informed decisionmak-
ing, it is necessary to hold the decisionmaker to a strict standard of knowledge
regarding the medical condition and treatment alternatives. To assist in this
decision, the Amendment authorizes HHS to provide grants for the establish-
ment of national and regional clearinghouses. The primary purpose of these
clearinghouses is to provide the most current and complete information regard-
ing medical treatment procedures and resources. 7 Also, HHS is required to
publish interim model guidelines to encourage the establishment within health
care facilities of infant care review committees.8 A review committee can
serve several important functions. First, it can verify that the most current in-
formation is being used. Second, it can confirm the propriety of a decision.
Third, it can help solve disputes between decisionmakers. Finally, it can refer
cases to the appropriate state child protection service agency when necessary. 9
Parental involvement is still necessary due to requirements for parental
consent before any medical treatment is initiated. 0 However, the Amendment
requires that when the infant's life is at stake, the infant's interests must take
priority over parental wishes. Once it is decided that treatment is medically in-
dicated, the physician is under a duty to seek parental consent. If he is unable
"See text supra pp. I 1-12 for the definition of medically indicated treatment.
"See 130 CONG. REC. S9307, 9324 (daily ed. July 26, 1984) (statement by Senator Nickles).
'Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749, 1753 (1984) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 5103(2) (A; 49 Fed. Reg. 48160, 48161 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec.
10, 1984).
"Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749, 1754 (1984); 49 Fed. Reg. 48170
(1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984).
048 Fed. Reg. 9630 (1983) (HHS citing President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research; See supra note 66.
"Under the common law parental consent is a prerequisite to any medical treatment. See Bonner v. Moran,
126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. and School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 469
P.2d 330 (1970). American courts generally follow the common law, except in certain emergency situations
and under certain circumstances where the minor consents. See Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1370 (1942).
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to obtain consent he must report the case to the appropriate state agency or
face charges of medical neglect. This state agency must then investigate the
case and, where appropriate, seek court action.' Thus, although parents are in-
volved in the decision-making process, they may no longer be the final deci-
sionmaker.
Since the parents must live with and are the most affected by the decision,
is it valid for Congress to take the decision away from them?92 Arguably this is
the very reason parents should not be the final decisionmaker; they are too in-
volved to make a disinterested decision which is necessary to adequately pro-
tect the infant's interests. The period following the birth of a disabled child is a
very traumatic time for the parents." At the same time, they are confronted
with a life or death decision of whether to withhold treatment.94 Parents are
faced with an obvious conflict of interest between their concern over the in-
fant's life and an uncertain future of financial and psychological hardship and
the unknown potential stress upon their marriage, family, and personal lives.
During the turmoil of the newborn period, can parents, who are often unaware
of the facts relevant to the child's future and unable to assimilate these facts
until the shock has worn off, make a reasonable decision which places the
child's interest first?"
Prior to the Infant Doe Amendment, the majority of the treatment deci-
sions were being made by the parents and the treating physician, often in con-
sultation with a social worker and clergyman.96 Dr. Shaw's survey revealed
"Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749(1984) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
5101-5107) (The Amendment places ultimate responsibility upon the designated state agencies for the pro-
tection of disabled newborns, see text infra pp. 21-23 for a discussion of these responsibilities.)
"See Duff & Campbell, supra note 9, at 894. But see Robertson, supra note 7, at 262-63. Professor Robert-
son argues that parents do not necessarily have to live with the choice as there is another option beyond the
treatment issue: Termination of parental rights and obligations through adoption or state custody. But the
adoption or state custody options raise serious issues of their own which are beyond the scope of this com-
ment. Generally, it is hard to find parents who want to adopt a disabled infant. The Amendment attempts to
remedy some of the negative factors associated with adoption of a disabled infant with additional funding to
help in his or her adoption. See The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749,
1755 (1984) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5111-5113). Institutionalization is another alternative which
under the existing state of the art may be more inhumane than allowing the infant to die. Thus, it is argued if
the government is going to require treatment of a disabled infant, it must supply the resources necessary to
ensure proper development of the child. See generally, Glick, Pediatric Nursing Homes: Implications of the
Massachusetts Experience for Residential Care of Multiply Handicapped Children, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED.
640 (Sept., 1983); Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy, 86 YALE L. J. 645, 657-58 (1977) Ihereinafter cited as Goldstein]; Angell, Handicapped
Children: Baby Doe and Uncle Sam. 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 659, 660 (1983); Duff & Campbell, supra note 9,
at 892.
"See generally Cohen, The Impact of the Handicapped Child on the Family. 43 SOCIAL CASEWORK 137
(1962); Fletcher, Attitudes Toward Defective Newborns, 2 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21 (1974).
9"Fost, Counseling Families Who Have a Child with a Severe Congenital Anomaly 67 PEDIATRICS 321
(March, 1981). (Dr. Fost suggests that those who believe the parent should make an informed decision risk
adding more anguish and anxiety to a family already under great stress. Also, because of the mass of data
and ethical analysis involved, to expose parents to such complexity may seem inhumane.)
931d.
"See, e.g. In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct., Ind., Apr. 12, 1982). See also, Duff
& Campbell, supra note 9; Shaw, Dilemmas of "'Informed Consent" in Children, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 885
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most practitioners felt the decision should be made by parents. 7 However,
commentators have been in sharp disagreement whether parents can make an
informed life or death decision within hours or days after the birth of a dis-
abled infant."
There was extensive debate in the House of Representatives on the
parents' role in the decisionmaking process. Some members argued that the
Amendment would be too intrusive into a decision which should be left to the
family. They proposed that the final decision should be made by the parents
after an informed consultation with the treating physician and a hospital
review committee." However, a majority of the House felt that this was inade-
quate assurance that the interest of the infant would be properly protected.""
Since most decisions were being made by the parents, the Amendment as
passed does represent a reduction of parental autonomy.'0 ' An examination of
the possibility of a constitutional challenge to the lessening of parental autono-
my is warranted. Judicial recognition of parental autonomy in recent years has
restricted government intervention into family matters. Yet, governmental in-
volvement in such areas as custody disputes, abortion, foster care, and child
abuse and neglect, demonstrates an often necessary and permissible role in reg-
ulating areas of parental decisionmaking concerning the welfare of children."' 2
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the broad issue of
whether there is a fundamental right of parental autonomy that is applicable to
the full range of parental decisions."' 3 Nor has the Court addressed the specific
issue of the extent of parental autonomy in the context of medical decision-
(1973) Ihereinafter cited as Shaw, Dilemmasl.
"'See Shaw, Ethical Issues, supra note II, at 594 (in Dr. Shaw's survey 50% of the group felt the parents
should make the decision while 33% felt either the physician or a hospital committee should decide.) (When
asked whether the courts or the legislature should decide there was uniform opposition) Id. at 598.
"See, e.g. Duff & Campbell, supra note 9 (They believe parents if properly informed are able to understand
and make reasonable decisions); Shaw, Ethical Issues. supra note I1, at 592-93 (The survey revealed that
71% of the pediatric surgeons and 62% of the pediatricians felt parents could make an informed decision
within hours of birth. Contra Robertson, supra note 7, at 263 (He discusses a potential need for an impartial
decisionmaker beyond the parents and physicians.) See generally Shaw, Dilemmas, supra note 96.
'See 130 CONG. REt. H376, 392-401 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) (debate of the Chandler Amendment as a
substitute for the proposed amendment. The Chandler Amendment was defeated).
I"Id
'"'See supra nn. I I- 19, 96-98 and accompanying text for a discussion on how decisions were being made.
'"'State intervention in domestic relations has always been an unhappy but necessary feature of life in our
organized society." (Quote by Justice Rehnquist in dissenting opinion in Stantosky v. Kramer, 445 U.S. 745,
771 (1982)). See Note, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the
State. 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Choosing for Children).
'"'See J. NOWAK. R. Ro'IUNDA. J. YOUNG. CONSTIUIIONAI. LAW 590-91 12d ed. (19831. If a fundamental
right is involved the Court reviewing the constitutionality of the law, will employ strict scrutiny and will
uphold the law only if it is the least restrictive means necessary to promote a compelling state interest. (In
practice it is virtually impossible to satisfy this standardl. If a fundamental right is not found then the Court
will review the law based on minimal scrutiny and will uphold the law so long as it is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest.
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making. However, an examination of the relevant decisions of the Court
reveals a limited constitutional protection of parental decisionmaking with
regard to certain aspects of family life.
Three cases suggest the existence of a parental fundamental right against
undue interference by the state in child rearing. In Myer v. Nebraska,' 0 the
Supreme Court invalidated a state statute which prohibited the teaching of
foreign languages in elementary schools. This was found to be an unconstitu-
tional infringement of "liberty"' ' guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment."',
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,"' the Court upheld the parents' free exercise
claim by striking down a state law requiring children to attend public schools
and thus preventing a choice of either private or parochial schools. 00 More
recently in Wisconsin v. Yoder,'"' the Court upheld the right of Amish parents
to remove their children from school after the eighth grade and to provide any
further education at home as required by their religious belief."'
Parental autonomy arguably may be protected by the fundamental right
of privacy. Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention the right of
privacy, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut"' formally recognized as a fun-
damental constitutional right, the right of personal privacy which guarantees
the individual freedom to make certain personal choices and decisions without
governmental intervention."' Griswold did not attempt to define the scope of
the right of privacy and left its boundaries to be decided on a case by case
basis."' The Court, however, in dictum has incorporated Myer and Pierce
under the protection of privacy through the concept of liberty guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment."' Nevertheless, in establishing the boundaries of
"Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
'"'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. (states in pertinent part; "No state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of the law.").
"'Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (The Court acknowledged that it had never attempted to
define "liberty," but in broad language went on to state it included the right to marry, establish a home, and
bring up children).
"'Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
"lid. at 534-35 (The Court stated "we think it entirely plain that [the law] unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.").
"'Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
"OId.
"'Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
"id. Based on the opinions in this decision and in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) the zone of privacy has
been found in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, the first, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments, and in the
concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the fourteenth amendment.
"'The decisions in which the Court has directly found the fundamental right of privacy at issue have dealt
mainly with the areas of contraception and abortion. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"'See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (In Roe the issue before the Court was whether an individual right
of privacy exists to decide whether to have an abortion. Justice Blackmun citing Myer and Pierce stated that
the right of personal privacy has some extension to activities relating to child rearing and education. Note
that the phrase "some extension" implies that not all decisions relating to child rearing are covered.) Id. at
153. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (In Carey the issue concerned distribution of
Winter, 1985] COMMENTS
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privacy the Court has never been directly faced with the issue of parental
autonomy pertaining to health care choices for children.
Myer, Pierce, and Yoder did establish certain fundamental rights in
parental decisionmaking which were later incorporated by dictum into the fun-
damental right of privacy. However, since the issues in these cases were limited
to education, religion, and morality,"5 it does not necessarily follow that paren-
tal autonomy would extend to medical decisionmaking. In fact the Court has
specifically recognized that there are limits to parental authority, particularly
where such decisions place the child's health or welfare in serious jeopardy.
The Court in Prince v. Massachusetts"' clearly recognized these limitations on
parental autonomy and noted that when the state is acting to guard the general
interest in a child's well being, the state can use its role as parens patriae"7 to
restrict the parents' control over the child."' Wisconsin v. Yoder"' reaffirmed
this principle when the Court stated "the power of the parent ... may be sub-
ject to limitation ... if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the
health or safety of the child."'20
Another limitation on parental autonomy may be found in the infant's
own constitutional rights. "Constitutional rights do not mature and come into
being magically only when one obtains the state-defined age of majority.
Minors as well as adults are protected by the Constitution and possess constitu-
tional rights."'' In addition, the Court in Prince suggested strongly in dicta
that if, in the exercise of parental authority, a conflict develops between par-
ents' rights and children's constitutionally protected interests, the latter will
prevail.'
The manner in which treatment decisions were being made prior to the
Infant Doe Amendment arguably raises equal protection and due process
challenges on behalf of the infant under the fourteenth amendment.' An
contraceptives. Justice Brennan gave a list of what was considered covered by the zone of privacy and he in-
cluded Myer and Pierce.) at 685.
"'See generally. Note, Choosing For Children, supra note 102, at 175.
"'Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
"'Parens patriae is a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign interests such as health,
comfort, and welfare of the people of the state. BLACKS LAW DICtIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
"'sSee, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (The Court went on to say "the state has a wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and that
this includes ... matters of conscience.") Id. at 167.
"'Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
'"Id. at 233-34.
"'Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634-35 (1979) (for a list of constitutional rights recognized by the
Court applicable to children).
"'See Nolan-Haley, supra note 7, at 13. The Court in Prince v. Massachusetts 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)
stated "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion
when they can make that choice for themselves."
"'See generally, Comment, Defective Newborns, supra note 20, at 581-88.
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equal protection challenge could be brought by a disabled infant because it is
the fact that he is disabled that presents the issue of nontreatment. In cases in-
volving a "normal" child where treatment is required to save a life, treatment is
provided even against parental wishes. 2"
A due process challenge would be based on deprivation of life without due
process of law. The Court recently faced a similar due process challenge in
Parham v. JR."'25 Minor children brought the action alleging that they had
been deprived of their liberty without due process of law by virtue of a state
statute which permitted parents to voluntarily admit minors to a mental
hospital. The Court held that although a minor's due process rights were not
equivalent to an adult's, the risk inherent in parental decisions to have a child
institutionalized is sufficiently great as to require an inquiry by a "neutral fact-
finder.' 2 6 This requirement was found to be satisfied by a physician's indepen-
dent examination and medical judgment. In addition, the Court required that
the "neutral factfinder" have the authority to disagree with the parents if the
child does not satisfy the medical standards for admission.'27 Basically, the In-
fant Doe Amendment embodies these same requirements. Based on the ra-
tionale of Parham and the dicta in Prince it appears valid to limit parental
autonomy in medical decisions in order to protect the infant's due process
rights. The finality of a decision not to treat a disabled infant only increases the
need for protection recognized in Parham.
In summary, the Amendment should survive review by the Court on the
issue of parental autonomy. No fundamental right has been established con-
"'See 130 CONG. REC. H 376, 381 Idailey ed. Feb. 2, 1984). (Rep. Erlenborn's example during the debates
puts the equal protection challenge in perspective:
If a robust 10-year old youngster became a victim of a serious automobile accident and sustained a
series of injuries that were both life-threatening and likely to result in severe and permanent han-
dicaps, there would be no question ... this 10-year old should receive immediately the best medically
indicated treatment, nutrition, appropriate general care and social services.
Why, therefore, should a day old infant who, at birth, is at risk with life-threatening congenital im-
pairments be denied the right to equal treatment and care?
The intent of the new [Infant Doe Amendment] affirms simply and unequivocably that such in-
fants are to be afforded the same rights to live that is guaranteed to an individual of any age with or
without a handicapping condition.)
See also Shaw, Ethical Issues, supra note Ii, at 596-97 (The responses in the survey show a much higher
regard for non handicapped children in need of surgery or treatment); Lower court decisions, outside the In-
fant Doe context, have consistently upheld a child's need for treatment over the parents objections
whenever the child's health is in serious jeopardy, for pertinent cases see Note, Judicial Limitations on
Parental Autonomy in the Medical Treatment of Minors, 59 NEB. L. REV. 1093, at 1115 n. 125; Note,
Choosing for Children, supra note 102, at 161-62. See also, Goldstein, supra note 92, at 652; R. HOROWITZ &
H. DAVIDSON, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 7.08, at 278-83 (1984).
--442 U.S. 584 (1979).
"'Id. at 606. See also Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (Justice Powell, with Chief Justice Burger and
two Justices concurring, and four Justices concurring in the judgment). Justice Powell listed three reasons
why the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adult's: (I) their particular
vulnerability; (2) their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; (3) the impor-
tance of the parental role in child rearing.
"'Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979).
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cerning parental authority to make medical decisions for a child. The decisions
of Prince and Yoder recognize a limitation on parental decisionmaking where
it appears the decision will jeopardize the health or safety of the child. Further-
more, based on Parham the Amendment protects the infant's own due process
rights by requiring a neutral factfinder, using reasonable medical judgment to
determine if treatment is medically indicated.
D. Applicable Law
The Infant Doe Amendment places responsibility for the protection of
disabled infants in existing state child protection service systems. 2" Protection
of children from abuse and neglect has always been a state and local respon-
sibility; the Amendment represents an expansion of these existing respon-
sibilities. 29 The Amendment requires states which receive financial assistance
under the Child Abuse Prevention And Treatment Act to provide its
designated child protective service agencies with the authority to seek legal
redress for cases of medical neglect, including the withholding of medically in-
dicated treatment from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions.3 °
Basically the Amendment requires states to include medical neglect as defined
in the Amendment in their definition of child abuse and neglect.
While previous attempts at governmental protection of disabled newborns
required federal governmental enforcement, the Amendment leaves enforce-
ment to the state. 3' This is one reason that groups which were adamantly op-
posed to the previous HHS attempts now support the Amendment.'
While many groups supported the idea of enforcement on a state level,
others have argued that child protective service systems are not capable of
handling this new responsibility. In testimony before the Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, Wayne M. Holder, Director of the childrens
division of the American Humane Association, questioned the capability of
child protection personnel in preventing child abuse: "The current state of the
art in child protective services is marginal to poor ... The field has moved for-
ward,... But serious problems in service delivery exist due to overload, worker
incompetence, inadequate supervision, inadequate leadership, lack of
resources, and inadequate community support."''
"'Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5101-5107). See 49 Fed. Reg. 48160, 48161 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec. 10,
1984).
" 49 Fed. Reg. 48160, 48161-162 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec. 10, 1984). See
generally, supra note 2.
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 48-457, 98 Stat. 1749, 1752 (1984) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 5103 (b) (2)).
"'See supra nn. 25-36 and accompanying text.
"'See supra note 36.
"'130 CONG. REC. H 376, 383 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984) Comments by Rep. Chandler 'quoting Wayne M.
Holder).
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Congress recognized this as an expansion of existing responsibilities and
in an effort to alleviate inadequacies in child protective service systems, has ap-
propriated additional funds to carry out the requirements of the
Amendment.'34 In addition, child protective service agencies will be able to
draw upon the new resources developed to assist the families and physicians
concerning availability of professional and private services within the com-
munity.'35
IV. CONCLUSION
On April 9, 1982, Infant Doe died of starvation because his parents, the
medical community, and the courts refused to provide routine corrective
surgery. This case aroused national interest and the ensuing attention revealed
that the various jurisdictions were arriving at different decisions regarding
medical treatment of disabled newborns. Because of this lack of uniformity, an
infant's life depended upon the jurisdiction in which he or she was born.
Congress passed the Infant Doe Amendment in order to develop a na-
tional policy on treatment decisions. The Amendment sets forth specific cir-
cumstances under which treatment can be justifiably withheld and requires the
decision to be based upon reasonable medical judgment.
As with all legislation, some will argue government involvement of any
sort is unwarranted, while others will seek stricter laws to ensure compliance.
The Amendment was a compromise of ideas set forth by a variety of groups
ranging from medical organizations to civil rights groups. Since the Amend-
ment limits parental authority in treatment decisions, a constitutional chal-
lenge is likely. However, a review of applicable Supreme Court cases suggests
that the Court will weigh the parents' right to decide against the infant's own
constitutional rights. Cases such as Prince v. Massachusetts,'36 Wisconsin v.
Yoder,"7 and Parham v. J.R."I indicate that the Court will uphold the Amend-
ment.
Other groups may question whether the Amendment will accomplish its
objective. Although the treatment decisions must be based on specific criteria,
a physicians own personal biases and relationship with the parents may in-
advertently sway the decision. 9 Perhaps the suggested infant care review com-
mittees should be mandatory.
'-4Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5101-5107); 49 Fed. Reg. 48160, 48162 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 1340) (proposed Dec. 10,
1984).
"'See Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 and 49 Fed. Reg. 48160.
16321 U.S. 158 (1944).
137406 U.S. 205 (1972).
138442 U.S. 584 (1979).
"'See Robertson, supra note 7, at 262-65.
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It has been pointed out that a decision to save the life of a disabled
newborn may require considerable financial support.' This need is also a fac-
tor that may not be fully addressed by the Amendment.
In summary, while the Amendment may not address all of these issues it
has taken a large step toward protecting disabled newborns with minimal
government intervention. If the Amendment had been in effect on April 9,
1982, Infant Doe would be celebrating his third birthday this year.
DANIEL J. MUMAW
''See American Academy of Pediatrics Joint Policy Statement: Principles of Treatment of Disabled Infants,
73 PEDIATRICS 559, 560 (1984).
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